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INTRODUCTION

"I think you ought to object, counselor," boomed the judge.' One
could not help but to be taken aback: this instruction was not directed
towards a pro se defendant, nor was it addressing an action by an
opposing party. Instead, the judge had actually suggested-with a
straight face and a hint of irony-that an attorney object to the
sentence the judge had just imposed. Unlike the attorney, the judge
had been following the development of a quirk in the circuit's
sentencing law. In United States v. Vonner,2 the Sixth Circuit had
recently held that a party must object to a sentence while still in the
trial court in order to preserve for appeal certain problems with the
sentencing order. This sentencing order objection requirement is
mandatory even if the party had presented all appropriate arguments
earlier during the sentencing hearing (as, indeed, this attorney had
done). 3
This strange occurrence results from the federal courts'
struggle to interpret the Supreme Court's recent overhaul of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which have long served as the
foundation of federal criminal sentences. 4 By deeming the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to be discretionary rather than mandatory,5 the
Supreme Court opened a Pandora's Box for appellate courts reviewing
the now-subjective sentences. 6
One of the many resulting procedural questions is the manner
in which parties should preserve issues for appeal. A clear circuit split
has emerged. Some circuit courts require only that a party argue for

1.
This account is based on a sentencing hearing observed by the author in July 2008 in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, the Hon. Thomas A.
Wiseman, Jr. presiding.
United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
2.
3.
Many courts have labeled this requirement for a "post-sentence objection." See, e.g., id.
at 410 (Moore, J., dissenting); United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir.
2007); United States v. Sepulveda-Contreras, 466 F.3d 166, 171 (1st Cir. 2006). However, the
author believes that "sentencing order objection" is a more appropriate description because the
requirement is for an objection to the sentencing order itself, not merely any objection that
occurs after the sentence.
4. Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1115, 1119-20 (2008) (explaining that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 implemented the
Sentencing Guidelines to restrict judges' "virtually unfettered discretion to set federal
sentences").
5.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
6.
Before the Guidelines became discretionary, federal sentencing review by appellate
courts was greatly restricted by statute. Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty:Appellate
Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 632 (1992).
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the desired sentence during the sentencing hearing,7 while other
courts require an objection after the judge's sentencing order,
regardless of whether the issue has already been raised.8 The latter
group is itself further divided as to which types of error must be noted
in the objection.
Valid policy justifications accompany both sides of the circuit
split. The circuits that require objections to sentencing orders have
recognized that certain procedural problems with the sentence can be
easily remedied by the trial court if brought to its attention in time,
thus avoiding a lengthy appeal and remand. 9 Even if a party has
already argued a point, an objection is a fail-safe way to ensure that
the judge correctly considered it. On the other hand, courts that do not
require sentencing order objections involving previously argued issues
fear creating "a trap for [the] unwary," resulting in the loss of
appellate rights for a party who is ignorant of the policy or simply does
not immediately recognize a problem during the hearing. 0
This Note argues that the requirement to object to a judge's
sentencing order should be abolished for two fundamental reasons.
First, the policy arguments against the requirement are stronger:
requiring objections (1) promotes frivolous redundancy, (2) creates a
procedural pitfall which could result in unfairly higher sentences, (3)
works against judicial economy by leading to collateral claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) is ultimately unnecessary
because prevailing parties already have incentive to perfect the record
themselves. Second, and more importantly, the sentencing order
objection requirement contradicts Federal Criminal Rules of
Procedure 51(a) and (b), the provisions governing the preservation of
claimed error.
Part I provides the context necessary to understand and
evaluate the sentencing order objection requirement. It explores the
history behind the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Supreme
Court cases which have modified their application. Part I then
explains the background to the circuit split in more detail, including a
discussion of the relevant statutes, an explanation of the possible
methods of review, and a description of precisely what kinds of error
might require an objection. Part II describes the various positions that
courts have taken in the circuit split.

7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts IIB, III.C.
United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2007).
United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Part III examines several sources of law to illustrate why the
objection requirement is both unsound and counter to federal
procedural rules. Specifically, this Part asserts that the requirement:
(1) effectively constitutes an "exception," 1 a technical formality long
abandoned and expressly abolished by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 51(a); (2) contrasts with a policy determination made by
Congress in amending Federal Rule of Evidence 103; (3) is
inconsistent with the liberal provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(a), which provides appellate filing requirements; (4) may
not be validly promulgated through appellate court "supervisory
authority"; 12 and (5) is invalid and ultimately inefficient for both of the
two reasonableness categories under which some circuits require the
objection. Part IV advocates that Congress or the Supreme Court
intervene to resolve the circuit split by unequivocally prohibiting
circuit courts from mandating the sentencing order objection.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

The discussion surrounding the sentencing order objection
requirement does not exist in a vacuum: it is but one facet of circuit
courts' attempts to rebuild federal sentencing procedure after a recent
overhaul by the Supreme Court. This Part will provide the context
necessary to understand the problem's creation and the surrounding
legal framework governing a solution. It will also discuss the risks
posed to a party that fails to make a sentencing order objection in a
jurisdiction in which it is required and explains the precise grounds on
which the party must object.
A. History
The Supreme Court initiated the sentencing order objection
debate through a series of decisions which struck down key parts of
the federal sentencing statute on constitutional grounds.13 Before

11. "Exception" is defined as a "formal objection to a court's ruling by a party who wants to
preserve an overruled objection or rejected proffer for appeal." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 603 (8th
ed. 2004).
12. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985) ("It cannot be doubted that the courts of
appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation of procedural rules
governing the management of litigation.").
13. Although these cases did not actually create or change the nature of sentencing order
objections, see United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007) (arguing that United
States v. Booker has not changed existing objection rules), the cases have created more
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1984, sentences imposed by federal district court judges were limited
only by statutory minimums and maximums; appellate court review
was under the very deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.14
Troubled by the wide sentencing disparities which resulted from the
broad discretion of trial judges, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 to create more uniformity in sentencing. 15 The
Sentencing Reform Act led to the establishment of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines") in 1989, which "limited the
district court's role in sentencing to an almost entirely mechanical
task of reviewing the sentencing grid to locate the Commission's
intended sentence for an individual defendant," based on the offense,
the defendant's criminal history, and the judicial findings at
sentencing.16 Appellate courts initially reviewed Guidelines
departures under three different standards, depending on what kind
of issue was being appealed.' 7 A 1996 Supreme Court decision rejected
this tripart approach, instituting an abuse-of-discretion standard.18
Congress established a de novo standard by statute in 2003.19
In 2000, the Supreme Court issued the first of several decisions
which held that many legislative efforts to control judicial discretion
in sentencing through rigid statutes violated the constitutional right
to a jury trial. 20 Examining New Jersey's sentencing system, the Court
held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that a defendant has the right to insist
that a jury-not a judge-decide any fact that increases a sentence
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. 21 As a result, the
Constitution barred an extended sentence based upon the trial judge's
determination that the crime at issue was motivated by racial bias. 22
Two years later, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's
rights had been violated by a state law which allowed the imposition
of the death penalty after a judge sitting without a jury found an

significance for such objections and provided additional considerations for how they can be
analyzed.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying a
"clearly erroneous" standard); Gregory v. United States, 585 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1978) (same).
15. Harrison, supra note 4, at 1119-20.
16. Id. at 1120-21.
17. Questions of law were reviewed de novo, findings of fact were reviewed for clear error,
and departures from the Guidelines were reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at
1122.
18. Id. (citing Koon v United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)).
19. Id. at 1123.
20. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
21. Id. The Court expressly listed a single exception: "the fact of a prior conviction." Id.
22. Id. at 471, 490-91.
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aggravating circumstance. 23 The Court also struck down another state
sentencing scheme which allowed the trial judge to enhance a
sentence beyond the maximum term permitted by state sentencing
guidelines by finding the defendant had acted with "deliberate
cruelty."24
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court extended these
decisions on state sentencing laws to the federal sentencing system,
noting that the state and federal sentencing procedures were
essentially the same in the way they handled judicial findings of
enhancement factors. 25 Because statutory maximum sentences could
be exceeded based on judicial findings of fact rather than facts found
by a jury, the Court held that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment. 26 As a result, the Court determined
that the Guidelines must be merely advisory: trial courts must still
consider Guidelines ranges but may "tailor [a] sentence in light of
other statutory concerns as well." 27 Although judges may continue to
make findings of fact relevant to sentencing without a jury, the Court
held that these determinations are "constitutionally inoffensive" if the
sentence dictated by the Guidelines is advisory instead of
mandatory. 28
The Booker Court also addressed how appellate courts should
review sentences under the new regime. For most of the Guidelines
era, circuit courts had reviewed sentences under a "reasonableness"
standard. 29 Two years before Booker, Congress established de novo
review for sentences departing from the Guidelines in an attempt to
make the Guidelines even more mandatory than they already were.30
The central holding in Booker-that the Guidelines must be
discretionary-nullified the policy behind Congress's change. 31 Thus,
the Court concluded that a "reasonableness" standard for reviewing
sentences would be most consistent with the existing framework. 32

23. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 590 (2002).
24. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
25. 543 U.S. 220, 230-33 (2005).
26. Id. at 233-34.
27. Id. at 245.
28. Ilya Beylin, Comment, Booker's Unnoticed Victim: The Importance of Providing Notice
Priorto Sua Sponte Non-Guidelines Sentences, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 961, 962 (2007).
29. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 (noting that a review for "unreasonable[ness]" was a "practical
standard of review already familiar to appellate courts").
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 261-62.
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The recent Supreme Court interpretations of the Guidelines
have created a number of problems for courts attempting to
administer the new system.33 In particular, judges and lawyers alike
have struggled with whether a party must object to a sentencing order
immediately after it is issued in order to avoid plain error review of
the sentence upon appeal. "Right now, the post-Booker opinions are
kind of all over the board," observed attorney Stephen Ross Johnson
after the Sixth Circuit granted en banc review for his client's
sentencing appeal. 34 With the decision, he remarked, "[t]hey could
rock our whole world. They could just tweak our world." 3 5 Yet even
lengthy appellate court opinions do not always resolve the matter.
"Everyone is trying to figure out what they have to do now," lamented
the same attorney after the Sixth Circuit ruled against his client.36
B. Relevant Statutes
Two laws directly govern the legal framework surrounding the
sentencing order objection requirement: the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, which establishes how the trial court should determine a
sentence, and Criminal Rule 51(b), which addresses how a party
should preserve an error made by the court. 18 U.S.C. § 3553, enacted
as part of the Sentencing Reform Act, addresses the "Imposition of a
Sentence" for a criminal defendant. Subsection (a) provides the
substantive requirement that "[t]he court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with . . . the need
for the sentence imposed." To make this determination, the judge is
required to consider the so-called "§ 3553(a) factors," including
considerations such as the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences

33. The unsettled questions include such matters as whether a judge must provide notice to
the parties before imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, whether and how to review
sentences for abuse of discretion as to the "substantive reasonableness" of a sentence (assuming
the issue has been properly preserved), and whether the new rules can be applied retroactively.
Harrison, supra note 4, at 1138; Beylin, supra note 28, at 971; James R. Dillon, Note, Doubting
Demaree: The Application of Ex Post FactoPrinciples to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
After United States v. Booker, 110 W. VA. L. REV 1033, 1034 (2008); Christine M. Zeivel, Note,
Ex-Post-Booker: Retroactive Application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
395, 417-19 (2008).
34. Tennessee Drug Dealer's Appeal Could Reshape Legal Landscape, FT. WAYNE J.
GAZETTE (Ind.), Oct. 26, 2006, at A5. The case, United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir.
2008) (en banc), is discussed frequently throughout this Note.
35. Tennessee Drug Dealer'sAppeal Could Reshape Legal Landscape, supra note 34, at A5.
36. Pamela A. MacLean, 'Reasonableness' Splits Circuits: Sixth Circuit Widens Breach on
Review Standard,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 2008, at 4.
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available, and the Guidelines, among others.37 Subsection (c)
mandates the procedural requirement that the trial judge "state in
open court the reasons for [his] imposition of the particular sentence"
and explain the reason for either picking a particular point within the
range or a point outside the range. The sentencing order objections
discussed in this Note arise from alleged judicial violations of 18
U.S.C. § 3553.
For criminal trials, "Preserving a Claim of Error" is addressed
in Criminal Rule 51(b):
A party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court-when the court ruling or
order is made or sought-of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party's
objection to the court's action and the grounds for that objection. If a party does not have
an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later
prejudice that party. A ruling or order that admits or excludes evidence is governed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 103.

This rule generally requires a party to raise an issue in the trial court
in order to have the opportunity to argue on appeal that the trial court
erred regarding that issue. The ultimate legal question posed by the
sentencing order objection debate is whether "informing the court"
requires a formal objection following the imposition of the sentence or
merely presenting argument before or during the sentencing hearing.
C. Plain ErrorVersus Reasonableness
The significance of the sentencing order objection requirement
ultimately hinges on the standard of review applied on appeal. There
are two ways in which an appellate court can review a claim of error
arising from sentencing: the "plain error" standard and the more
generous "reasonableness" standard. Criminal Rule 52 provides that
federal appellate courts may review an issue for plain error even when
a party has not properly preserved the error by objecting in the
appropriate manner. 38 This standard is often described as "stringent"39
and "mandates reversal only in exceptional circumstances and only

37. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) (2000).

38. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); accord FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). However, plain error does not extend to waived errors,
which involve the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
39. In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Pereira, 465 F.3d
515, 520 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 226 (4th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Higdon, 418 F.3d 1136, 1139 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wood, 364 F.3d 704, 708
(6th Cir. 2004); Wennik v. Polygram Group Distribution, Inc., 304 F.3d 123, 130, 132 n.10 (1st
Cir. 2002).
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where the error is so plain that the trial judge and prosecutor were
derelict in countenancing it."40 At least one judge has opined that
parties are "penalized" when the failure to object to a sentencing order
subjects them to plain error review. 4 1
In contrast, the review of properly preserved sentencing error
is more liberal because appellate courts reviewing trial courts'
selection of sentence must "ensure sentences are both reasoned and
reasonable." 42 Questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of
fact are subject to clear error review. 43 Appellants prefer
reasonableness review to plain error review given the considerably
shorter hurdle to clear. 44
Although always available on appeal-regardless of
preservation of error-the plain error standard is far less desirable
and can control the outcome of a case. 45 Therefore, when this Note
discusses a "requirement" to object, it refers to an action needed to
achieve reasonableness review.
D. Categoriesof Reasonableness
Courts may consider the overall reasonableness of a sentence
on "procedural" and "substantive" grounds. The distinction is
particularly significant when a court requires a sentencing order
objection for only one of these forms. 46 Procedural reasonableness is
based on "the method by which the sentence was calculated." This
includes considerations such as whether the Guidelines were
misapplied or if the court "did not adequately explain the sentence
with reference to the [§ 3553(a) factors]."47 Substantive reasonableness

40. United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1994)).
41. Unites States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 398 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Clay, J.,
dissenting).
42. Anna Elizabeth Papa, A New Era of Federal Sentencing: The Guidelines ProvideDistrict
Court Judges a Cloak, But is Gall Their Dagger?, 43 GA. L. REV. 263, 277 (2008) (quoting Douglas
A. Berman, Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 142, 142 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/berman.html).
43. United States v. Fuller, 426 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Creech, 408
F.3d 264, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005).
44. Most of the cases regarding sentencing order objections discussed in this Note revolve
primarily around which standard should be used, not whether the appellant meets that
standard.
45. See infra Part III.C.
46. See infra Part II (discussing courts which both do and do not distinguish the forms of
reasonableness).
47. United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2006).
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is based on whether the sentence is unreasonably harsh or lenient
based on § 3553(a)'s requirement that a sentence be "sufficient, but
not greater than necessary."48
Jurists disagree as to whether procedural and substantive
reasonableness are divisible or are only two facets of overall
reasonableness. 49 Among Justices who have spoken directly on the
matter, Justice Scalia apparently believes that appellate courts should
review the reasonableness of sentencing rulings on purely procedural
grounds.50 Justice Stevens, on the other hand, wrote that Booker
"plainly contemplated that reasonableness review would [also] contain
a substantive component." 5 1 As a rudimentary example of when
substantive reasonableness might come into play, Stevens noted that
"a district judge who gives harsh sentences to Yankees fans and
lenient sentences to Red Sox fans would not be acting reasonably even
if her procedural rulings were impeccable." 52
Circuit courts have split on whether reasonableness should be
divided into procedural and substantive components. The Sixth, 53
Eighth, 54 Ninth,55 and Tenth5 6 Circuits require sentencing order
objections only for procedural reasonableness, while other courts
maintain the same requirements for either form (whether they do or
do not require objections).5 7 Part III.E will argue that courts should
not require sentencing order objections for either category of
reasonableness.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Part examines the various positions and arguments of the
circuit courts. Circuits are grouped into categories where sentencing
order objections (A) are not required, (B) are required, (C) are required

48. Id. at 1183.
49. See Harrison, supra note 4, at 1138.
50. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 382-83 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 365 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-64
(2005)).
52. Id. Of course, some Bostonians may disagree with this assessment.
53. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
54. United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 477 (8th Cir. 2007).
55. United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 868-71 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the "crucialbut often-overlooked-distinction between procedural error and substantive reasonableness").
56. United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
57. Compare United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2005) (not
requiring objection to either form), with United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
2007) (requiring objection to both forms).
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only for procedural reasonableness, and (D) lack an established rule.
This Note will advocate the position of courts not requiring objections
when a party has already presented its arguments to the trial court.

A. Circuits in Which Sentencing Order Objections Are Not Required
Four circuits do not require sentencing order objections to
preserve previously raised issues for appeal: the Third, Fourth,
Seventh, and D.C. Circuits.5 8 In the leading case of United States v.
Castro-Juarez, the Seventh Circuit found that requiring objections
would "create a trap for unwary defendants and saddle busy district
courts with the burden of sitting through an objection-probably
formulaic-in every criminal case." 59 The court recognized that
sentencing order argument concerning the reasonableness of a
sentence may be useful in some situations.6 0 However, the court
ultimately held that a rule requiring an objection regarding § 3553(a)
factors already presented would fail to "further the sentencing process
in any meaningful way."6 ' Also recognizing the lack of purpose for
requiring redundant argument, the Fourth Circuit declined to require
a party to make "a futile objection at the end of the sentencing
colloquy" once it had "vigorously argu[ed] for a sentence [and] made
unmistakably clear its position." 62
The D.C. Circuit, quoting Castro-Juarez's "trap for [the]
unwary"
policy
rationale,
took
a
rule-based
approach:
"Reasonableness . . . is

the standard of appellate review, not an

objection that must be raised upon the pronouncement of a
sentence." 63 In other words, there is no basis for requiring a trial court
to function essentially as an appellate court by reviewing its own
sentence under the appellate standard. Without
providing
its
reasoning, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, simply declared in a
footnote, "An objection to the reasonableness of the final sentence will
be preserved if, during sentencing proceedings, the defendant properly
raised a meritorious factual or legal issue."6 4

58. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v.
Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2006); Castro-Juarez,425 F.3d at 433-34; United States v.
Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
59. 425 F.3d at 433-34.
60. Id. at 434.
61. Id.
62. Curry, 461 F.3d at 459.
63. Bras, 483 F.3d at 113 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005)).
64. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007). In an unpublished
opinion, a three-judge panel distinguished Grier, refusing to remand a sentence where the trial
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B. Circuits in Which Objections Are Required for Proceduraland
Substantive Reasonableness
The Second and Fifth Circuits require sentencing order
objections to preserve an issue for appeal even if the party has already
raised the matter during the sentencing hearing. 65 With respect to
substantive reasonableness, the Second Circuit noted that parties
should be fully aware of a judge's responsibility to consider the §
3553(a) factors and the Guidelines, and that objecting to the failure to
do so is "neither difficult nor onerous."66 The Second Circuit's rationale
is based on judicial economy: the "requirement alerts the district court
to a potential problem at the trial level and facilitates its remediation
at little cost to the parties, avoiding the unnecessary expenditure of
judicial time and energy in appeal and remand."67 As for procedural
reasonableness, the court listed several justifications for requiring
objections: the ease of determining whether there has been a violation,
the public interest in resolving sentencing error promptly, the ability
of the district court to better articulate its reasons for sentencing
during the first hearing than long afterwards, and the "incentives for
the parties to help the district court meet its obligations."68
The Fifth Circuit, in addition to citing judicial economy, noted
that "the rule requiring objection to error [is] one of the most familiar
procedural rubrics in the administration of justice."69 The court
rejected the Seventh Circuit's arguments in Castro-Juarez, arguing
that nothing about Booker created an exception for objections in
sentencing and that the "trap for the unwary" logic could be extended
to virtually any type of error. 70

judge did not specifically refer to the § 3553(a) factors because of the "unusual" situation in
which the defendant had asked for the sentence he actually received. United States v. Chatman,
243 F. App'x 736, 737 (3d Cir. 2007).
65. United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208, 211 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007).
66. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 208.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 211.
69. Peltier, 505 F.3d at 391-92 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the court
applied plain error review to the alleged substantive and procedural reasonableness errors, id. at
392-94, it is unclear whether the court's policy arguments were intended to apply to both forms
of reasonableness or only to substantive reasonableness.
70. Id. at 391.
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C. CircuitsRequiring Objections Only for ProceduralReasonableness
The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held
expressly that sentencing order objections are required for objections
based on procedural, but not substantive, reasonableness.71 In United
States v. Torres-Duenas, the Tenth Circuit held that "when the
defendant fails to object to the method by which the sentence was
determined ... we review only for plain error. But when the claim is
merely that the sentence is unreasonably long, we do not require the
defendant to object in order to preserve the issue."7 2 The Eighth
Circuit adopted the same approach. 73 Unfortunately, neither court
74
provided any explanation as to why this distinction was made.
The Ninth Circuit established rules for sentencing order
objections in two separate cases. First, in United States v. Sylvester
Norman Knows His Gun, III, the court held that an objection at
sentencing was required to avoid plain error review for procedural
reasonableness but did not provide its reasoning.7 5 Three years later,
the court addressed objections for substantive reasonableness in
United States v. Autery.76 Reviewing the circuit split and analyzing the
respective policy arguments, the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning
of Castro-Juarez and held that a party need not object to the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence to avoid plain error review if
the party previously argued against the sentence imposed.7 7 Unlike a
matter of procedural error, which may be an easily corrected mistake,
a substantive reasonableness challenge after sentencing "would be

71. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v.
Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 477 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 868-71 (9th Cir.
2009); United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
72. 461 F.3d at 1182-83 (citations omitted). But see United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505
F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a party is not excused from objecting on
substantive reasonableness grounds when it fails to argue an issue either before or during
sentencing hearing).
73. United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (holding that party must object to procedural
error); United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 476-77 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Torres-Duenas, 461
F.3d at 1182-83) (holding that party need not object to substantive reasonableness).
74. The Eighth Circuit did, however, quote Castro-Juarezto explain its reasoning for not
requiring objection to substantive reasonableness error. Wiley, 509 F.3d at 477. Further, the
Eighth Circuit indicated that it would be unfair to require an objection at sentencing when a
party does not have notice of the court's intention to depart from the Guidelines until the actual
pronouncement of the final sentence. Id. at 476-77.
75. 438 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2006).
76. 555 F.3d 864, 868-71 (9th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 870-71 (quoting United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir.
2005)).
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both redundant and futile" because "the parties have already fully
argued the relevant issues."78
In United States v. Vonner, an en banc Sixth Circuit held that
parties must raise sentencing order objections for procedural-but not
substantive-reasonableness79 and offered a thorough discussion in a
lengthy majority opinion and three dissenting opinions. The majority
opinion articulated a policy argument which advocated the efficiency
of requiring objections.8 0 However, the decision was primarily
grounded upon a rule-based approach. Citing Criminal Rule 51(b), the
court wrote that parties have a duty to object "[a]t a sentencing
hearing, as at every other phase of a criminal proceeding."8 1 The court
reasoned that a pre-sentence argument on § 3553(a) factors is distinct
from a post-sentence argument on how the court considered those
factors. Under this view, it would actually be impossible for a party to
"raise objections already made" after the sentence because, of course,
only the sentence could trigger an objection to the sentence.8 2 Thus,
while the failure to make a sentencing order objection "did not
undermine [the defendant's] right to appeal issues he had 'previously
raised,' it did undermine his right to challenge the adequacy of the
court's explanation for the sentence."8 3
The Vonner court noted that "the district court's job is to
impose a sentence 'sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to
comply with the § 3553(a) factors, not to impose a 'reasonable'
sentence." 84 After all, Criminal Rule 51(b) does not require a party to
register a complaint that the proposed sentence is "unreasonable"the appellate standard of review. However, this "does not excuse
counsel from the obligation to raise all arguments concerning the
appropriate procedures at sentencing and the bases for a lower or
higher sentence." 85 Thus, a party does have to object on the grounds of

78. Id.
79. 516 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2008). Although the majority opinion failed to clearly
articulate that substantive reasonableness objections need not be preserved by an objection,
Judge Clay's dissent noted the court "seems" to apply the rule only to procedural challenges. Id.
at 398 (Clay, J., dissenting). Citing Vonner, the Sixth Circuit later confirmed Judge Clay's
interpretation. United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 755 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 2008).
80. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 390 (rule "gives counsel a chance to ask the sentencing judge for
clarifications about the proposed sentence it just announced").
81. Id. at 385.
82. Id. at 390.
83. Id. at 386 (quoting United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2004)).
84. Id. at 391 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)).
85. Id.
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procedural reasonableness. In his Vonner dissent, Judge Clay resolved
the apparent disparity-that a party need not object to reasonableness
but must object to the procedural errors in the sentencing order-by
asserting that the majority failed to recognize that procedural and
substantive reasonableness are two aspects of overall reasonableness
which appellate courts review on appeal. 86 Under Judge Clay's view,
these two aspects may be separately considered but not divided
entirely, making an objection requirement to only one form of
reasonableness a misapplication of the doctrine.8 7
The legal circumstances surrounding Vonner were different
from similar cases in other circuits due to the Sixth Circuit's
particular sentencing hearing requirements stemming from its
holding in United States v. Bostic.88 Under the so-called "Bostic
Question,"8 9 district courts within the circuit are required, after
announcing the sentence, to "ask the parties whether they have any
objections to the sentence . . . that have not been previously raised."9 0

This policy "gives counsel a chance to ask the sentencing judge for
clarifications about the proposed sentence it just announced."9 1
Further, the policy enables the court to avoid the escape clause in
Criminal Rule 51(b) that a party may not be prejudiced for failing to
object if the party "does not have an opportunity to object." The Sixth
Circuit's distinction between pre- and post-sentence objections is thus
more concrete-and traps for the unwary are perhaps amelioratedbecause district court judges provide a warning that an objection may
be appropriate. 92 However, Bostic does not directly address the
sentencing order objection requirement as discussed in this Note
because the Bostic Question was created in response to a party who
failed to present a § 3553(a) argument at any time during the
sentencing hearing. 93 In Vonner, the party had argued for a lesser

86. Id. at 398 (Clay, J., dissenting).
87. Id.; see also United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 369 (6th Cir. 2009) (Clay, J.,
dissenting) (noting the close relationship of a substantive argument raised during the hearing to
the procedural error of a district court failing to adequately discuss the argument).
88. 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar rule. United States
v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993).
89. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 390 (referencing the "Bostic question").
90. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004).
91. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 390.
92. Id. at 386.
93. 371 F.3d at 870-72.
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sentence during the hearing but simply did not object to the judge's
sentencing order prior to the conclusion of the proceeding. 94
D. CircuitsInternally Divided on Sentencing Objection Rules
The sentencing order objection debate remains unsettled in the
First and Eleventh Circuits. The First Circuit has conflicting opinions
with little discussion on the matter,95 although one decision, United
States v. Gallant, provided an explanation for its opposition to the
objection requirement.96 In Gallant, the court offered a policy
justification-the need for finality-noting that "few trial judges
would warm to a rule which requires continued argument after the
court gives its sentence." 97 That court also noted that, unlike many
other procedural requirements, there is no Criminal Rule giving
advance notice to counsel of an obligation to make sentencing order
objections.98 To the contrary, Criminal Rule 32 provides that the court
should entertain argument from both defendant's counsel and the
government "before imposing sentence."99
Eleventh Circuit decisions are divided into several unpublished
opinions that either require sentencing order objections in order to
avoid plain error review, 00 do not require sentencing order
objections, 01 or consider the issue but expressly decline to establish a
rule.102

94. 516 F.3d at 384.
95. Compare United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 37 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009) (renewal of
argument after sentencing not required), and United States v. Gibbons, 553 F.3d 40, 46 n.3 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Gallant, 306 F.3d 1181, 1188-89 (1st Cir. 2002)) (same), with
United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (plain error when defendant failed to
object to court's explanation of sentence), and United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 82
(1st Cir. 2009) (plain error review when defendant failed to object to judge's unsupported
statement during sentencing).
96. 306 F.3d at 1188-89.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 1189.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Simone, No. 09-10642, 2009 WL 2168944, at *1 (11th Cir. July 22,
2009) (per curiam) (objection required for procedural reasonableness); United States v. Hill, 308
F. App'x 440, 441 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Palis, 305 F. App'x 558,
561 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (objection required for procedural and substantive
reasonableness).
101. United States v. Aenlle, 327 F. App'x 152, 155 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("[S]o as
long as a party states its objection to the sentence at some point during the sentencing hearing,
its failure to repeat the objection at the conclusion of the imposition of sentence will not result in
a waiver of that objection."); United States v. Castellanos, No. 08-11418, 2009 WL 179616, at *12 (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 2009) (per curiam) (holding that an argument made before, but not after,
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III. REJECTING THE SENTENCING ORDER OBJECTION REQUIREMENT
This Part presents five reasons why a party should not have to
object to the manner in which a sentence is issued in order to appeal
the reasonableness of that sentence. First, the requirement essentially
brings back the "exception" rule, which was expressly abolished by the
rules of procedure several decades ago. Second, the requirement
directly conflicts with a policy determination made by Congress in
amending a similar evidentiary rule, Evidence Rule 103. Third, the
requirement is inconsistent with federal appellate policy, as indicated
by the liberal provision for appeals as of right in Appellate Rule 3(a).
Fourth, the requirement violates limits on the use of appellate
supervisory powers over district courts. Finally, the sentencing order
objection requirement is invalid and inefficient for both procedural
reasonableness and substantive reasonableness concerns.
A. "Exception" to the Rule
The approach of requiring objections to a sentencing order is
functionally a resurrection of a common law tradition formally
abandoned long ago. Until 1944, objections alone were insufficient to
preserve claims of error in criminal cases. 103 Lawyers were also
required to preserve an issue in a "bill of exceptions" by promptly
taking an "exception" to a ruling overruling the objection.104 This was
done by "remarking 'Exception,' 'Note my exception, please,' or other
words to that effect, following an adverse ruling by the court." 0 The
purpose of the bill of exceptions was to preserve the relevant portions

the sentencing order is not subject to plain error review, although arguments never made during
the sentencing hearing are subject to plain error review).
102. United States v. Blanco, 327 F. App'x 139, 148 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(declining to announce rule for procedural reasonableness); United States v. Long, No. 06-13332,
2008 WL 4997057, at *14 n.11 (11th Cir. Nov. 25, 2008) (per curiam) (same); United States v.
Lake, 285 F. App'x 735, 736 n.2 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (declining to announce rule for
substantive reasonableness); United States v. Moulton, No. 08-13895, 2009 WL 1587795, at *2
n.3 (11th Cir. June 9, 2009) (per curiam) (declining to announce rule for substantive or
procedural reasonableness); United States v. Williams, No. 06-15962, 2007 WL 3118326, at *1
(11th Cir. Oct. 25, 2007) (per curiam) (same); see also United States v. Sotolongo, No. 09-10427,
2009 WL 2634027, at *2 n.2 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2009) (per curiam) (noting "in passing" that the
circuit "ordinarily reviews objections to sentencing issues not raised in the district court for plain
error" but that the defendant's argument failed under both reasonableness and plain error
review).
103. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(a) (abolishing exception in criminal trials).
104. ALBERT H. PUTNEY, 10 POPULAR LAW LIBRARY § 133 (1908).
105. ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS § 4.12, at 190-91 (2d ed. 1973).
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of the trial in order to create a record for the appellate court to
review. 0 6
When verbatim transcripts became available for modern
judicial proceedings, the formalistic "exception" requirement was no
longer necessary for appellate courts to effectively review cases. 0 7
Accordingly, Congress abolished the "exception" requirement for civil
cases in 1937 by approving Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46, which
states in present form: "A formal exception to a ruling or order is
unnecessary. When the ruling or order is requested or made, a party
need only state the action that it wants the court to take or objects to,
along with the grounds for the request or objection." 08 Seven years
later, Congress approved a similar provision in Criminal Rule 51(a):
"Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary."
Criminal Rule 51(b) mirrors the second sentence of the civil rule. The
Advisory Committee Notes state: "This rule is practically identical [to
the civil rule] ....

It relates to a matter of trial practice which should

be the same in civil and criminal cases."o 9
The abolishment of "exceptions" extends directly to other
situations where requiring an objection would be redundant. In fact,
even an initial objection may not be required once a party and the
court have made their positions clear. Professors Wright, King, and
Klein advise: "If the problem has been brought to the attention of the
court, and the court has indicated in no uncertain terms what its
views are, to require an objection would exalt form over substance."" 0
The substance of the case, after all, ought to be the primary

106. PUTNEY, supranote 104, § 134.
107. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE §6.15, at 84 (2d ed. 2006). Recordings of
all proceedings in federal court were first required by the Court Reporter Act of 1944. 28 U.S.C. §
753(b) (2006).
108. FED R. CIV. P. 46 advisory committee's note; see also Gunnar H. Nordbye, Comments on
Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 672, 681 (1952) ("All that
counsel needs to do during the trial is to make his objection to any ruling or order of the court, or
to make known to the court the action that he desires the court to take and in all instances to
state his grounds therefor."). Although exceptions are no longer required, attorneys sometimes
continue the practice out of habit or to avoid "the appearance of acquiescence." KEETON, supra
note 105, § 4.12, at 191.
109. FED R. CRIM. P. 51 advisory committee's note. In an early opinion addressing the new
criminal procedural rule, a Pennsylvania district court remarked after overruling the defendant's
motion that "exception has been noted at request of counsel, although in my opinion the same is
unnecessary in view of the provisions of [Fed. R. Crim. P. 51]." United States v. Katz, 78 F. Supp
21, 24 n.1 (M.D. Penn. 1948).
110. 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 842
(3d ed. 2004); accord FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(a) (explaining that "[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of
the court are unnecessary").
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consideration for whether-and to what extent-a defendant should
1 '
be punished."
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agreed that objections
are unnecessary when a party's intent has already been made clear,
quoting the above "form over substance" language and citing the
criminal rule abolishing "exceptions" for support. The Third Circuit
held that when "the district court clearly understood that [the
defendant] was asserting these arguments ... there was no need for
[the defendant] to take the additional step of repackaging the
government's statement as his own formal objection to preserve his
right to appeal." 112 The Seventh Circuit held that "[b]ecause both [the
defendant's] position and the trial judge's ruling were clear, [the
defendant] preserved the issue sufficiently for review," despite not
making an objection.113 A defendant in the Ninth Circuit was not
required to object after closing arguments on a matter that had
already been raised and resolved before the trial.114 Several other
circuits have similarly held that a formal objection would constitute
an "exception" when a party's position is already evident."' Courts
have also applied the civil counterpart of the criminal "exception" rule
to hold that formal objections are unnecessary under similar
circumstances in civil cases.116
In United States v. Ortiz, the Seventh Circuit extended this
rationale-that formal objections are unnecessary when a party's

111. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006) (stating that the first factor courts are directed to
consider when imposing a sentence is "the nature and circumstances of the offense").
112. United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1995).
113. United States v. Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 424 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988).
114. Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 545 (9th Cir. 1966).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1993)
("[R]equiring the renewal of objections after a definitive ruling may be a needless provocation to
the trial judge . . . ."); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(holding that re-raising an issue resolved definitively before trial would constitute an exception);
United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 939 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (refusing to require further
objection when "counsel made amply clear to the trial judge the action which he desired the court
to take"); see also United States v. Flenoid, 415 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that "a
motion in limine is an objection" and need not be re-raised).
116. See, e.g., Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that a formal
objection to a ruling excluding the plaintiff from the trial of his claim was unnecessary when "the
court and the other litigants know what action [the] party desires the court to take); United
States v. Barndollar & Crosbie, Inc., 166 F.2d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1948) (holding that, although a
party must "make known to the court the action he desires taken," an objection was not
necessary because "the complaint and the statement of counsel made early in the trial, left no
room for oversight or doubt that the very essence of the action was to enforce a lien"); accord
FED. R. CIV. P. 46; cf. McComb v. Goldblatt Bros., 166 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1948) (holding that
a party could not appeal a procedural issue to which he had not objected in the district court and
had in fact "acquiesced in the procedure").
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intent is clear-by expressly equating sentencing order objections with
the obsolete "exception."117 In Ortiz, the court held that the
defendant's previous objection to the pre-sentence report and
subsequent argument was sufficient to preserve the issue raised for
appeal.118 The fact that the defendant did not continue to object after
the judge had ruled on the pre-sentence report did not constitute
waiver.11 9 The court determined that a decision to the contrary would
effectively require a party to take an "exception," and "the clear
language of Criminal Rule 51(a) states that there is no need to do
so."120 In United States v. Paul, the Seventh Circuit again dealt with
the issue in a case in which the defendant did not object to the court's
sentence and seemingly assented to it by remarking, "Okay." 2 1
Because he had previously argued against the sentence, however, the
court held that the defendant had not forfeited his objection: "Once a
court has conclusively ruled on a matter, it is unnecessary for counsel
to repeat his objection in order to preserve it for appeal" because doing
so would constitute an "exception."122
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the sentencing order
objection requirement is functionally identical to an "exception"
because it imposes a procedural requirement in response to an adverse
ruling in order to preserve an issue for appeal. The only difference is
the purpose: sentencing order objections are intended to reduce error
in the trial court, whereas the bill of exceptions was intended to assist
appellate courts by providing a better record of the dispute. Because
the bill of exceptions was a necessary evil in the days before verbatim
recordings, common law courts found it reasonable to distribute the
burden to both parties to conduct post-ruling actions. The sentencing
order objection requirement, however, addresses only the
singlehanded and avoidable mistakes of the trial judge, making it
unfair to impose the same burden on a party as in the case of the

117. 431 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 2005).
118. Id.

119. Id. at 1038.
120. Id. at 1039; see also United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 3, 2009) (No. 09-302) ("[Tlhe rules do not require a litigant to complain
about a judicial choice after it has been made. Such a complaint is properly called, not an
objection, but an exception.").
121. United States v. Paul, 542 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2008).
122. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(a) and United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th
Cir. 2005)); cf. United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding

that a defendant is not excused from objecting to substantive reasonableness when he fails to
argue an issue at all before or during sentencing hearing and assents to the sentence).
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"exception." It is the responsibility of the judge-not the parties-to
ensure that the sentencing order is properly issued.123
By effectively constituting an "exception," the sentencing order
objection requirement violates Criminal Rule 51(a). The requirement
further contradicts Criminal Rule 51(b), which also governs preserving
error for appeal, for two similar reasons. First, Rule 51(b) expressly
allows a party to preserve an issue by "informing" the court of the
action requested in some fashion, not simply by a formal objection.
Just as courts consider a strict objection requirement to be "form over
substance" when a party has already made its position clear during a
trial, the same should be true at sentencing hearings. 124 Second, Rule
51(b) allows such notice to be provided when the order is "sought"before the judge has ruled-instead of only after the court has issued
the order. 125 The sentencing order objection requirement explicitly
violates this principle by forcing a party to object after the judge has
ruled instead of permitting the party to simply present its position
during the argument portion of the hearing. Rule 51(b) is equally
incompatible with the sentencing order objection requirement as an
"exception" requirement.

B. Renewing the Objection to Renewing Objections
The controversy surrounding the sentencing order objection
requirement is reminiscent of a similar problem regarding Evidence
Rule 103. Before Congress intervened in 2000, the circuits were split
as to whether evidentiary objections overruled in limine must be
renewed when the evidence was actually offered at trial.12 6 Equating
renewal with the "exception," Congress modified Rule 103 to specify
that, once the court has made a definitive ruling in limine, further
argument is not required to preserve a claim of error. The Advisory
Committee Notes describe a second objection as "more a formalism

123. See United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 371 (Clay, J., dissenting) ("It makes no
sense, and is fundamentally unfair, to place the burden for creating an adequate record for
appeal on criminal defendants rather than district court judges.").
124. See United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 424 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988); Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 545 (9th
Cir. 1966).
125. See United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the phrase
"or sought" in FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b) to explain why an issue may be preserved before the
sentence is issued, thus making a sentencing order objection unnecessary).
126. Compare Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1980) (renewal required),
with Rosenfeld v. Basquait, 78 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1996) (renewal not required).
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than a necessity" because such a renewal would constitute an
"exception." 127
Congress's decision to not require a renewed evidentiary
objection suggests that Congress disfavors obligating redundant
actions before the court. There is little functional difference between
the renewals of arguments after a judge has ruled on a motion in
limine and after a judge has issued a sentencing order. Accordingly,
congressional intent supports those courts that have held that
sentencing order objections are not required in order to preserve
issues for appeals.
C. 'Appeal As of Right" Gone Wrong
All jurisdictions establish rules for how cases arising therein
may be appealed. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, like the
rest of the federal rules, are designed to minimize procedural hurdles
so as to promote resolution of issues on their merits. 128 Keeping with
this principle, a sentencing order objection requirement should be
presumed to be disfavored absent further direction from Congress.
Appellate Rule 3(a), similar to the majority of states, requires
only that a party file a timely notice of appeal to initiate the appellate
process. 129 In contrast, some states require some additional form of
post-judgment activity in order to obtain an appeal. The Tennessee
state rule, for example, requires that issues appealed from jury trials
must first have been raised in a motion for a new trial with the trial
court.130 The purpose of Tennessee's mandatory procedural rule is "so
that the trial judge might be given an opportunity to consider or to

127. FED. R. EVID. 103 advisory committee's note.
128. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 479 (2008) ("The
'liberal ethos' of the Federal Rules refers to the underlying policy toward which the rules as a
whole incline: the facilitation of litigant access in the interest of reaching merits-based
resolutions of cases." (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986))).
129. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a) ("An appellant's failure to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal."); see also 16A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3949.1 (4th ed. 2008) ("The filing of the
notice of appeal with the district clerk and within the time allowed by Rule 4 is the critical
requirement for appealing as of right from a district court judgment or order.").
130. TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e); see also State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997)
(holding that a defendant relinquishes the right to argue on appeal any issues that should have
been presented in a motion for new trial); Donald F. Paine, 10 Significant Differences Between
State and Federal Civil Procedure, 38 TENN. B.J. 27, 29 (2002) (stating that a motion for a new
trial is optional in federal court but mandatory following a state jury verdict in order to appeal).
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reconsider alleged errors"13 1-the very justification of federal circuit
courts requiring sentencing order objections. Defendants in California
who plead guilty must file a statement with the trial court presenting
reasonable grounds for challenging the legality of the sentencing
proceeding in order to appeal.132 Nebraska requires the government to
present any claimed errors to the trial court within twenty days of the
final order in order to seek appellate review.133 In Maine, the
government must receive permission from the attorney general before
appealing a criminal case.134
In contrast to states which mandate additional post-judgment
activity in order to appeal, the Advisory Committee Notes to Appellate
Rule 3(a) indicate a deliberate decision not to require any procedural
actions to appeal other than merely providing notice to appeal.135
First, the Notes specifically indicate that the rule "requir[es] nothing
other than the filing of a notice of appeal."136 Second, the Notes
explain that Congress saw no need to specifically preclude any
abolished common law procedures in the body of Appellate Rule 3(a)including assignments of error-because they are "assumed to be
sufficiently obsolete."137 Even the lone step provided in Appellate Rule
3(a) is not always strictly enforced: courts have liberally construed the
"notice of appeal" requirement so as not to prevent review "on the
merits . . . on the basis of mere technicalities" so long as "an overriding

intent to appeal may be reasonably inferred." 38
Circuit courts may not make more stringent litigation
requirements than provided by the federal rules. For example, the
Supreme Court struck down the Fifth Circuit's "heightened pleading

131. McCormic v. Smith, 659 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tenn. 1983).
132. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West 2004); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.06(3) (West 2001)
(prohibiting direct appeal from a guilty plea absent an "express reservation").
133. State v. Baird, 472 N.W.2d 203, 204-05 (Neb. 1991); accord NEB. REV. STAT. § 292315.01 (2008).
134. ME. R. APP. P. 2(a)(4).
135. For a collection of sources discussing the weight that should be afforded to Advisory
Committee Notes, see Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370, 377 n.6 (Utah 2006).
136. FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee's note.
137. Id.
138. Jones v. Chaney & James Constr. Co., 399 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1968) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also K.H. Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2006) (liberally construing the rule to allow appeal "where it is clear that the
overriding intent was effectively to appeal"); Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1992)
(liberally construing the rule); In re TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1414 (5th
Cir. 1992) (liberally construing the rule to allow appeal "if the intent to appeal a particular
judgment can be fairly inferred, and if the appellee is not prejudiced or misled by the mistake"
(quoting Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991))).
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standard" for civil claims because it exceeded the liberal "short and
plain statement" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2).139 A stricter approach, the Court wrote, "must be obtained by
the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation." 14 0 The sentencing order objection requirement is even
more problematic because it not only makes the process more difficult
but also adds the entirely new burden of an affirmative responsibility
to object.
Of course, whether a party receives an appeal as of right is a
different issue than whether a party receives a favorable standard of
review when appealing a sentence. However, the significance may be
exactly the same. If a sentence is unreasonable but not plainly
erroneous, the standard of review is just as dispositive as whether the
appeal can proceed in the first place.141 Although states desiring postjudgment actions to promote efficiency explicitly lay out the desired
steps in statutes,142 no clear guidance is provided in the federal rules
to instruct attorneys whether they must object to a sentence at the
end of the hearing.143 The resulting ambiguity as to whether Criminal
Rule 51(b) encompasses sentencing order objections should be resolved
to reflect Congress's explicit statement on a nearly identical issue.
D. Supervisory Authoritarians
Federal appellate courts may promulgate their own local rules
of procedure via their "supervisory authority" over district courts
within the jurisdiction. This power may not be exercised when the rule
is inconsistent with the law or the Constitution, regardless of how

139. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993).
140. Id. The Supreme Court has also struck down judicially-created rules which violated
statutes independent of rules of procedure. See, e.g., Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199, 216-17 (2007)
(pleading of "exhaustion" for claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act); Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595-97 (1998) (proof of "improper motive" for certain constitutional
claims); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (allegation of bad faith when suing a public
official whose position might entitle him to immunity if he acted in good faith).
141. For example, in United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 753-54 (6th Cir. 2008), the
majority rejected a procedural reasonableness challenge to a sentence under a plain error
standard while the dissent, applying reasonableness review, concluded the sentence should be
vacated. Id. at 762 (Clay, J., dissenting).
142. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
143. United States v. Sepulveda-Contreras, 466 F.3d 166, 171 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[U]nlike other
areas, there is no Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure giving advance notice to counsel of a
requirement to make post-sentence objections." (quoting United States v. Gallant, 306 F.3d 1181,
1189 (1st Cir. 2002))).
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strong any policy arguments in its favor may be.144 For example, in
United States v. Payner, the Supreme Court struck down the Sixth
Circuit's exercise of its supervisory authority to suppress evidence
illegally obtained from third parties. 145 The basis of this decision was
that the Court had already established on constitutional grounds that
exclusion was not merited under such circumstances.1 4 6
The Supreme Court upheld the use of supervisory authority to
require a specific type of objection in Thomas v. Arn.147 The Sixth
Circuit had mandated that a party make a pointed objection in the
district court to a magistrate's recommendation on pretrial matters in
order to appeal.148 Because Congress had established magistrates to
assist district court judges with their increasing caseload by resolving
many preliminary matters, the Court found that automatic de novo
review over all matters already considered by the magistrate would
eviscerate the purpose of having magistrates in the first place.1 49
The Sixth 5 0 and Eleventh' 5 ' Circuits have legitimately
asserted their supervisory powers in one area of the sentencing order
objection context. These courts require district judges to ask the
parties at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing whether they have
any objections to the sentence which they have not previously raised
("the Question").152 Just as in Thomas, the Question requirement is

144. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146, 148 (1985) ("Courts of appeals have supervisory
powers that permit . . . the promulgation of procedural rules governing the management of
litigation.... Even a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power, however, is invalid if it
conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions. A contrary result would confer on the
judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with
enforcing." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980); see also United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 53 (1992)
(striking down circuit court's supervisory authority over grand juries, in contradiction of
constitutional "common law").
146. Payner, 447 U.S. at 735-36 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
147. 474 U.S. at 141-42.
148. Id. at 144.
149. Id. at 151-53.
150. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004) (announcing a "new
procedural rule" in requiring district courts to ask parties upon conclusion of the sentencing
hearing whether they have any objections to the sentence not previously made). But see id. at
877-78 (Ryan, J., concurring) (arguing that "the Question" was an invalid use of supervisory
authority).
151. United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
906 (1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th
Cir. 1993). But see id. at 1103 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (arguing that the Question was an
invalid use of supervisory authority).
152. Cf. United States v. Hardeman, 933 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1991) (declining to adopt
Jones "absent an explicit statutory command").
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directly supported by statute: Criminal Rule 51(b) contemplates the
possibility that a party will not have the chance to object to a ruling
and provides that, in such a case, the failure to make an objection will
not later prejudice that party.153 When the Question is asked, the
appellate court can be certain that a party did not lack the
opportunity to object to an issue without the "difficulty of parsing a
transcript."154 Moreover, the Question does not create an extra hurdle
for the parties but simply helps guarantee the rights the statute is
designed to protect. The burden is on the trial judge-not the
parties-to correctly follow the Question procedure.155
The sentencing order objection requirement imposed on the
parties, however, exceeds the supervisory authority of appellate
courts. Rather than promoting any statutory policies, the requirement
actually violates Criminal Rule 51.156 Courts may not disregard the
limitation of the laws they are charged with enforcing regardless of
how "sensible and efficient" the intended policy may be.15 7 Further,
the potential for prejudice to a party is great because a failure to
follow the procedural requirements may result in forfeiture of
significant appellate rights. 58
E. Categorically Unreasonable
Like most circuit courts, this Note has referred to sentencing
"reasonableness" generally without specifying which categorysubstantive or procedural-is specifically being considered. However,
circuits should not be able to require objections to either form.
A sentencing order objection requirement for substantive
reasonableness (that a sentence is too long or short) is the least likely
to result in any remedial action by the trial judge and the most likely

153. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b) ("If a party does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or
order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party.").
154. Bostic, 371 F.3d at 872 n.6. Indeed, the reason the Sixth Circuit created the rule in
Bostic was because the court had difficulty determining whether the prosecutor had a chance to
present his arguments at sentencing. See id. at 870-72 (analyzing the prosecutor's statements to
determine whether he had the opportunity to object).
155. Id. at 872 ("If the district court fails to provide the parties with this opportunity, they
will not have forfeited their objections and thus will not be required to demonstrate plain error
on appeal.").
156. See supra Part III.A (discussing the violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(a)-(b)).
157. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 737 (1980)).
158. See supra Part I.C (discussing the distinction between plain error and reasonableness
review); supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining that the standard of review may be
dispositive of an appeal's success).
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to violate the rules of procedure. In terms of utility, "requiring the
parties to restate their views after sentencing would be both
redundant and futile." 15 9 To make a substantive objection is
"essentially ask[ing] for reconsideration," 16 0 but there is little reason
for a judge to change her mind if a party has already presented all of
his arguments before and during the sentencing hearing. As indicated
by the title of this Note, an attorney would literally be forced to
complain to the judge that the court's judgment is unreasonable. As
for a circuit's ability to legitimately exercise its supervisory authority,
district courts are directed to impose a sentence that is "sufficient, but
not greater than necessary." 161 Yet the Supreme Court made clear in
Booker and its progeny that appellate courts should "review
sentencing decisions for unreasonableness." 162 Thus, asking a district
court to review itself using the appellate standard turns the system on
its head.
Moreover, it seems unfair and inappropriate to force attorneys
to accuse a judge of using poor judgment in his or her own courtroom.
As the First Circuit remarked, "[F]ew trial judges would warm to a
rule which requires continued argument after the court gives its
sentence." 163 It was for this reason that-shortly after the "exception"
was abolished-U.S. District Court Judge Nordbye urged lawyers to
be wary of "futile" complaints on rulings, even when the lawyer
possesses "utter disagreement and sometimes . ..

contempt of the

court's lack of understanding." 16 4 Avoidance of such confrontation also
justified Congress's decision to establish an automatic objection to a
judge acting as a witness: an attorney should not be required to
practice before a judge "likely to feel that his integrity had been
attacked by the objector."16 5 There is certainly a potential for a
vigorous sentencing order objection to anger, or at least annoy, the
judge.
Requiring procedural reasonableness objections (that a judge
miscalculated or did not adequately explain the sentence) has at least

159. United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2009).
160. United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 476-77 (8th Cir. 2007).

161. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) (2006).

162. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005); see also United States v. Vonner, 516
F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (stating that "reasonableness is the standard of appellate
review"); United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that
"[r]easonableness ... is the standard of appellate review").
163. United States v. Sepulveda-Contreras, 466 F.3d 166, 171 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Gallant, 306 F.3d 1181, 1188-89 (1st Cir. 2002)).
164. Nordbye, supra note 108, at 681.
165. FED. R. EVID. 605 advisory committee's note.
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some merit. From a policy standpoint, there may well be occasions
where this form of objection could actually make a positive
contribution to judicial economy. For example, a party may notice that
the judge has made a minor mistake and get the judge to correct it
before the hearing is adjourned. A district judge is required by statute
to provide "the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,"166
meaning that a party may appeal a sentence because the judge failed
to explain the factors resulting in the sentencing decision, not
necessarily because the judge failed to actually contemplate the
appropriate factors. For example, the dispute in Vonner arose because
the judge merely said he had "considered" the appropriate § 3553(a)
factors without specifically addressing them; even the majority
opinion conceded that "[n]o one would call this explanation ideal."167
By simply requesting that the district court provide the necessary
explanation, a possible appeal and remand could be avoided in some
cases.
However, although an objection to procedural reasonableness
could promote judicial economy in a particular case, a rule requiring
objections to sentencing orders could result in the opposite effect in
the aggregate. By creating a new procedure for attorneys to follow,
courts also create a new way in which attorneys can render ineffective
assistance of counsel. The failure of a lawyer to object or raise an issue
at sentencing may already allow a defendant to obtain a new
sentencing hearing. 68 Where an objection to the sentencing order is
also required, an attorney's neglect to do so may result in a court
having to decide in a separate appeal whether "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and
whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." 169 Thus, reducing grounds for direct appeal may well
produce more litigation on collateral review-hardly a net savings in
judicial economy in the long run. The delay in sentence finality is an
even greater concern to the defendant left in limbo as to whether his

166. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)
(stating that judges must "set forth their reasons" for imposing a sentence"); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (stating that judges must "adequately explain the chosen
sentence").
167. United States v.Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
168. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2008) (failing to protest non-qualifying
convictions being used under a habitual criminal statute); United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331,
336 (3d Cir. 2007) (failing to object to an improper enhancement in the Presentence Report);
United States v. Sims, 218 F. App'x 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2007) (same).
169. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
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sentence will be lengthened or shortened. Moreover, a party should
not be held responsible for ensuring that the judge follows his own
statutory procedural duties in imposing a sentence.170
Requiring objections to only one form of reasonableness 7 1 may
be problematic when there is overlap between procedural and
substantive error. For example, the Sixth Circuit noted that "[a]
challenge to a court's decision to impose a consecutive or a concurrent
sentence is not easily classified as 'substantive' or 'procedural.' "172 It
is not obvious whether circuits with mixed requirements should
mandate objections to such overlapping claimed errors. Although one
court held that it would be "inappropriate and patently unfair" to
apply the sentencing order objection requirement in this context,173
another strongly suggested that it would do so.1 7 4 Even if a circuit is
willing to excuse the failure to object to error it finds to encompass
both forms of reasonableness, a party would nonetheless be prejudiced
if a court concludes that the claimed error is, in fact, purely
procedural. In light of the lingering confusion and inconsistencies
within circuits regarding reasonableness categories for certain kinds
of error,175 a mixed objection requirement is an even greater trap for
the unwary than a requirement to object to all claimed error.
Ultimately, these pragmatic and policy considerations are
secondary to binding statutes and rules already in place. Requiring a

170. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000) ("The court ... shall state in open court the reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence . . . .") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Simmons,
587 F.3d 348, 371 (Clay, J., dissenting) ("It makes no sense, and is fundamentally unfair, to place
the burden for creating an adequate record for appeal on criminal defendants rather than district
court judges.").
171. See supra Part III.C (discussing circuits requiring objections to procedural, but not
substantive, error).
172. United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2009) ("This is so because an
evaluation of the substantive reasonableness of a decision to impose a consecutive sentence
depends heavily upon an evaluation of the procedural reasonableness."); see also United States v.
Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting "lingering confusion" about which
form of reasonableness encompasses a challenge to the district court's rejection of the base
offense level prescribed under the Guidelines); United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1308
n.10 (noting that, although the district court's failure to explain a sentence ordinarily constitutes
procedural error, "the undeniably sparse record in this case certainly bears on the question
whether [defendant's] sentence is substantively reasonable").
173. Herrera-Zuniga,571 F.3d at 580.
174. United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1117 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing id.) ("This court
need not decide whether similar leniency is appropriate in this case because the district court
committed no procedural error. Nevertheless, when presented with a sentencing error that
arguably overlaps both reasonableness categories, the better practice is certainly to
contemporaneously object to that error.").
175. Herrera-Zuniga,571 F.3d at 579-80.

264

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1:235

party to functionally take "exception" to a judge's sentencing
decision-even for procedural reasons-violates Criminal Rule 51(a).
IV. OBJECTIONS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED

Thus far, this Note has identified that the sentencing order
objection requirement conflicts with the statutory language of several
federal rules of procedure. Although Congress is free to amend these
rules to mandate (or at least allow) the requirement, several policy
rationales dictate that Congress should instead clarify that sentencing
order objections are optional.
The sentencing order objection requirement has its advantages.
Some errors can be remedied by the sentencing judge simply adding a
few sentences to the ruling with a more complete explanation for the
basis of the decision.176 In such cases, an objection may result in the
judge fixing the potential problem during the hearing with little
cost.177 However, requiring the objection can create a trap for unwary
defendants. The resulting extra step in the sentencing process will
become trivial and formulaic once attorneys develop the precautionary
habit of objecting to each and every sentence as a matter of course.178
The redundancy of a procedural objection which parrots previously
raised arguments seems unproductive when "the court and the other
litigants know what action [the] party desire[d] the court to take."1 79
Ultimately, the courts and Congress are left to balance the
dangers and benefits of the sentencing order objection requirement.
On one hand, the rule will result in some defendants and prosecutors
inadvertently forfeiting the right to fully appeal a sentence. On the
other hand, judicial economy will sometimes be promoted when judges
are prodded by counsel to fix certain mistakes on their own, thus
eliminating the need for appeal and remand. Considering that a
mandatory rule is likely to give rise to more claims of ineffective
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) (requiring the judge to state the reasons for imposing a
particular sentence).
177. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that a
sentencing order objection "alerts the district court to a potential problem at the trial level and
facilitates its remediation at little cost to the parties").
178. United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2005). In fact, such
mechanical objections are occurring. When one attorney simply said, "Your Honor, I object just
for the record for the procedural, substantive aspects," a divided Sixth Circuit panel held that
objections require greater specificity in order to satisfy the goals of the requirement. United
States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 358 (6th Cir. 2009). But see id. at 369 (Clay, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the district court should have realized that the procedural objection pertained to
the substantive arguments presented earlier during the hearing).
179. Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1976).
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assistance of counsel, however, the judicial economy factor may
actually weigh against the sentencing order objection requirement.
Abolishing the sentencing order objection requirement would
not prevent correction of an easily remedied sentencing order in the
trial court. Along with the losing party, the prevailing party also has
the opportunity and the motivation to object to an inadequate
sentencing order. Both parties "have the right to an explicit ruling and
a statement of the grounds therefore." 8 0 It is simply good lawyering
for "the winning party [to] protect[] a record for appeal [by] taking the
necessary action to deprive the other side of a legal issue that might
be asserted as grounds for reversal on appeal."181 A party satisfied
with a sentence-but unsatisfied with the procedure in which it was
issued-may "preserve victory by seeing to it that the findings and
conclusions are properly [issued] and support the judgment."182 The
successful party has strong incentive to protect the record: avoidance
of the time and costs of an unnecessary appeal and the risk of the
appellate court making an unfavorable change to the sentence.183
Thus, a sentencing order objection requirement is not essential for
achieving productive objections because they may always be
volunteered by the other side. By splitting the burden to perfect the
sentencing order equally between the judge, the prosecutor, and the
defendant, judicial economy goals can still be achieved without risking
punishment to an unwary party.
The Supreme Court has failed to show any interest in the
sentencing order objection issue thus far, denying certiorari to en banc
cases both requiring and not requiring sentencing order objections. 184
However, the divided circuits provide a compelling reason for the
Court to intervene should Congress fail to do so. As Justice Scalia
states, "[T]he main purpose of [the Supreme Court's] certiorari

180. J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS, & ETHICS 184 (3d ed. 2002).

181. Ellis J. Horvitz, Protecting Your Record on Appeal, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL: A
PRIMER FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 235, 235 (John G. Koeltl ed., 1983).

182. Id. at 237.
183. The First Circuit demonstrated this principal when vacating a sentence after neither
party objected to a district judge's erroneous statement about the defendant during the
sentencing order. United States v. Gonzilez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 82 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009)
("Notwithstanding the failure of GonzAlez's attorney to raise the error, we note that the
government also contributed to the error by failing to call the matter to the attention of the
sentencing court.").
184. Vonner v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 68 (2008) (denying certiorari for en banc case
requiring sentencing order objections); Grier v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 106 (2007) (denying
certiorari for en banc case not requiring sentencing order objections).
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jurisdiction [is] to eliminate circuit splits."185 Although states should
be allowed to experiment with different laws and procedures to find an
optimal approach, federal courts should not.186 To allow otherwise
would permit "the moral equivalent of an equal protection violation"187
in light of the single jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to fault circuit courts for using their supervisory
authority to promote judicial economy. A bright-line rule forcing a
party to object at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing may well
result in a preemptive strike against procedural error at the district
court level before appellate resources are utilized. However, this gain
is not worth the significant cost of sacrificing the rights of a party who
is either unaware of the mandatory rule or does not immediately
recognize a technical problem with the sentence in the heat of
courtroom battle. Although some circuit judges may view the debate
as a purely academic matter, the stakes could not be higher for the
ever-increasing number of federal prisoners whose sentences are often
measured in decades with no possibility of parole.188
The sentencing order objection requirement does not foster the
interests of justice. More importantly, the objection requirement
directly contradicts the policy behind several statutes and the plain
language of the federal rules of procedure. Accordingly, Congress or
the Supreme Court should act to resolve the circuit split by expressly
establishing that, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party need only
raise that issue once during the sentencing hearing.
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185. Nunez v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2990, 2991 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Aaron H. Caplan, Malthus and the Court of Appeals: Another Former Clerk Looks at the
Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 957, 966 (1998). But see Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265 (2004) (deciding to "await further experience with [the
disputed rule's] applications in the lower courts" before issuing exercising supervisory authority).
187. Caplan, supra note 186, at 966.
188. Of course, it is not just a defendant who may be harmed by the sentencing order
objection requirement: the government may also wish to receive appellate review over the
reasonableness of a sentence it considers too lenient. See, e.g., United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d
864, 867 (9th Cir. 2009) (government appealing a sentence that was below the Guidelines range
after not objecting in trial court); United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2006)
(same).
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